Book review: The Conservative Party in Wales, 1945-1997 by Sam Blaxland

John Davies

At the recent UK election, the Conservatives won no seats in Wales. This last happened in 1997 and 2001, and before that at the Liberal landslide in 1906. Sam Blaxland argues that these extremities feed a trope that the Welsh Conservative cause is hopeless. On the contrary, he argues, over the longer view there is “a history of relative success to be told of the Tories in Wales”.  He presents a persuasive case and, in doing so, implies a question about what appetite Conservatives have for a future that includes sharing power in devolution Wales.

Since 1945 the Conservative share of the Welsh popular vote has rarely dipped far below 30%. At the 1983 election their 31% was barely 6% adrift of Labour’s vote (Keir Starmer just formed a government on 33.7% of the UK vote) and three of Cardiff’s four seats were held by Conservatives.  As recently as 2019, Conservatives won 14 of 40 Welsh seats. The Senedd’s proportional voting system reflects Conservatives’ real strength and since 1999 they have formed the official opposition for most of the time.

Conservatives, unsurprisingly, have performed best in the areas delineated “British Wales” on the Zimmern model.  Even here, though, seats were not secure enough to provide a foundation for reliable Westminster careers and really ambitious Tories have tended to leave Wales. Geoffrey Howe (Port Talbot), Michael Heseltine (Swansea) and Michael Howard (Llanelli) represented a remarkable concentration of generational talent and, with a small diversion of fate, any of them might have become Prime Minister. Howe and Heseltine cut their teeth fighting unwinnable constituencies at home, but Wales simply couldn’t offer the seats or connections to power necessary for advancement.

Arid environment

Blaxland describes the limitations of a party that struggled to make impact in Wales – anglicised, alien, an absence of political activism and Wales-specific policy.  He recognises the role of those few activists who kept the party afloat in a politically arid environment. The party tried but struggled to find working class Welsh candidates who might appeal to voters and defaulted to retired colonels and English barristers.  In the decades after the war Wales began to assume an identifiable political shape with a discrete agenda.  The Conservatives were slow to cotton on but where they did so, they had some success, such as in Pembroke with Nick Edwards and Ynys Mon with Keith Best.

Social movement

Blaxland is strong on the role of members, agents, volunteers, women and young people; too often the history of political parties is reduced to the stories of its most prominent members. In the 1950s the Conservatives had around 3 million members across the UK. The party was as much a social movement as a political one, including its vital function as a marriage bureau: Thatcher, Major and May all met their spouses through the party.  We learn that the Barry constituency association alone had some 11,000 members. Astonishing.

Wales was never a priority for Central Office and the party struggled to pay its small professional staff. A remarkable number of associations were led by titled (and entitled?) men. Tories were unembarrassed by social hierarchy; it was part of what they believed in and the squire was expected to help cover election expenses.  The first woman candidate was adopted in 1955 but at no election in the 20th century were there more than two female Tory candidates in the whole of Wales. Blaxland shows that only towards the 1980s/90s was the base of Tory candidates really broadened out beyond retired colonels and English barristers.

In the absence of any serious policy thinking, Welsh Conservatives defaulted to union jacks, jam and Jerusalem, social deference, snobbishness and social climbing. Things moved on but many Conservatives still struggle to articulate a real vision for Wales as opposed to a lazy “for Wales, see England” rubric.  The anglicised legacy of the Conservatives continues to limit its appeal in spite of the efforts of intelligent figures like Nick Bourne and David Melding to map a clearer Welsh pathway.

The first practical step towards Welsh administrative devolution was enacted by Conservatives in 1951 when they created a ministerial post for Welsh affairs. It was a baby step – and filled first by a Scotsman and then an Englishman – but some will be surprised they took it at all. The decision was based on a paper prepared by a young Central Office staffer, J Enoch Powell.

Proconsular culture

The Conservatives governed Wales continuously from 1979 to 1997. Thatcher and Major largely allowed successive Secretaries of State to get on with it as they saw fit, creating a proconsular culture at the Welsh Office. Nicholas Edwards is singled out for his energy and vision. The whole Cardiff Bay development, including the very land on which the Senedd now stands, owes a good deal to him. Blaxland correctly emphasises the contribution of Wyn Roberts and the important extension of Welsh language education provision. After trying very hard to do the wrong thing, the Conservatives eventually did the right thing and created S4C. Blaxland judges, reasonably, that the Conservatives were “were, in part, architects of contemporary Wales”.

By the time devolution began the Conservatives were well placed to build on their credentials and develop as a potential partner for power. Under Nick Bourne they nearly pulled this off in 2007 as part of a putative rainbow coalition. Since then, they allowed themselves to be pushed into the margins without any clear purchase on Welsh policy. With a reliable core vote in a proportional system, the way is wide open for them to shape debate and position themselves as a viable partner for power if they choose to engage.

There are some weaknesses in the book. The author justifies not considering local government due to space constraints. This feels inadequate. The Conservative presence in Welsh local government has been significant and without even a brief survey, the story doesn’t feel complete. The Welsh Office reform of local government in 1994, and the creation of 22 unitary authorities, has continuing consequences today and yet is unmentioned.

Heavy industry

Blaxland is also weak on the economic agenda. He rightly emphasises inward investment as an instrument of policy but soft pedals on Conservative stewardship of the economy in the 1980s/90s. The ending of Wales’ heavy industry economy was a massive change in the nation’s economic history and yet is scarcely discussed. The Miners Strike 1984-85 was arguably the most important event in Welsh history over the book’s period yet is only glancingly mentioned: what were Welsh Conservatives doing, thinking and saying about it?

Ground is covered unevenly.  Blaxland is sound on Nicholas Edwards and Wyn Roberts but there is more to say about Redwood, and Hague, glaringly, is not considered at all.  This feels odd, not least how and why English politicians came to be appointed in the first place and the alienating impact of this on Welsh politics. Blaxland covers the grassroots of the party well, but it feels perverse to achieve this while not considering fully the Conservatives’ actual record of running Wales.

However, this is a good read and surprisingly entertaining.  Blaxland is no partisan but presents a fair-minded view. He tells a simple truth when he argues the Welsh Conservatives ought to be able to do more with their decently reliable core vote in Wales. Arguably they attract more support than their imagination and talent have deserved, rather than the other way around.

This book takes us to 1997 and Blaxland suggests there is another book to be written on Conservative fortunes in the devolution period.  There is, and if Sam Blaxland writes it, I will look forward to it.

The Conservative Party in Wales, 1945-1997 by Sam Blaxland is published by the University of Wales Press and is available from all good bookshops.