Democracy derailed: What happened after Guinea-Bissau’s Presidential election

Branwen Gruffydd Jones, Professor of International Relations, Cardiff University

Guinea Bissau is a small country on the coast of West Africa, neighboured by Senegal and Guinea (Conakry). It is not dissimilar in size to Wales.

On Wednesday 26 November 2025, just days after Presidential elections took place and before the results could be announced, the miliary took control and the incumbent President, Umaro Sissoco Embaló, fled the country. Opposition leaders remain in military detention.

The following is an interview with members of the UK/Guinea Bissau Community, an humanitarian, not-for-profit organisation whose purpose is to promote cultural ties, offer support and work on initiatives related to Guinea-Bissau or the Guinean community primarily in the United Kingdom.

The situation in Guinea Bissau is very tense and urgent, and little reliable information is available beyond the country due to the suspension of communications within and from the country. The more detailed news that is available is mainly in Portuguese. Please could you start by providing a summary of the key events that unfolded in the days following the Presidential elections took place on Sunday 23 November?

 The presidential election on Sunday, 23 November 2025, was expected to be a decisive moment for Guinea-Bissau. Throughout the campaign period, there was strong public mobilisation and anticipation of a democratic transition. Early indications from civil-society tallies and independent observers suggested a decisive victory for Fernando Dias da Costa (backed by Domingos Simões Pereira and PAI Terra Ranka), widely viewed as the legitimate winner.

After failed attempts by the incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and his allies to bribe key figures involved in monitoring the election and to interfere with the ballot-counting process — including unsuccessful efforts to steal ballot papers — Embaló publicly stated that he would accept defeat once the official results were announced.

However, before the National Election Commission could announce the official results, armed elements of the military intervened violently, surrounding key government buildings, suspending communications, shutting down media, and sealing the country’s borders. Within hours, Guinea-Bissau was effectively under military control.

Simultaneously, several political leaders — including, Domingos Simões Pereira (DSP), and Octávio Lopes — were forcibly detained and taken to the local police station. However, an independent verification is impossible due to the communication blackout.

The coup therefore interrupted the electoral process at its most crucial moment and plunged the country into an atmosphere of fear, uncertainty, and silence.

Dr Geraldo Martins, the vice president of the PAIGC and former Prime Minister confirmed in an interview given on the 29^th November 2025, to the Portuguese newspaper Público that Embaló ordered the coup to avoid “humiliation” from losing and that he had long threatened DSP and PAIGC. After fleeing, Embaló continued issuing orders to the junta from abroad. So the coup was explicitly intended to prevent the announcement of Embaló’s loss.

Ultimately, Embaló viewed DSP as the country’s most popular political figure and the main force behind Dias’s landslide. PAIGC’s exclusion and DSP’s arrest were deliberate attempts to eliminate him politically.

International news media reported that Domingos Simões Pereira and others were apprehended by the military, and taken to unknown locations. Please can you give details of others that you know of who were also arrested?

Alongside Domingos Simões Pereira, we have confirmed that Octávio Lopes, a respected political adviser and senior figure within the PAIGC-associated movement, was detained.

We have also received reports — though difficult to verify due to the blackout — that several regional campaign coordinators, civil-society activists, and at least one member of the National Electoral Commission have been detained or threatened, alongside five magistrates.

The pattern indicates targeted arrests of individuals linked to democratic legitimacy or to the expected electoral victory of the opposition. At this stage, no public accounting of detainees has been released by the junta. Beyond DSP and Octávio Lopes, armed men invaded PAIGC headquarters and Dias’s campaign HQ. Youth activists were attacked with tear gas. Various party officials and campaign workers have also been detained or threatened.

These arrests were over a week ago. Do you have any recent news about their situation?

More than a week on, there is still no official information from the junta about the exact whereabouts or condition of Domingos Simões Pereira, Octávio Lopes, or the other political detainees. International actors – including the UN and ECOWAS – continue to refer to them simply as “detained officials and opposition figures” and have publicly called for their immediate release, but the military authorities have not provided any list of detainees, any proof of life, or any access for lawyers, families, or independent observers.

From what we can gather through family and close associates, DSP and Octávio Lopes remain in military custody, held incommunicado and without medical oversight. The fact that even high-level ECOWAS and UN delegations have left Bissau without being able to see or speak to them is deeply alarming and reinforces fears for their physical integrity. By contrast, president-elect Fernando Dias da Costa has now been granted protection inside the Nigerian Embassy in Bissau, after Nigeria formally warned of an “imminent threat” to his life – which underlines how serious the overall situation is for opposition leaders.

There were two candidates in the elections that took place on Sunday 23 November, the incumbent Umaro Sissoco Embaló, opposed by Fernando Dias da Costa. The military take-over has interrupted the democratic process and the announcement of the results of the elections. What do you know of indications and expectations that already existed regarding the likely outcome of the elections?

Prior to the military intervention, all available indicators — including exit polling by civic organisations, partial tallies from polling stations, and widespread reports from political observers — suggested that Fernando Dias da Costa held a clear and likely irreversible lead over the incumbent, Umaro Sissoco Embaló. Dias’s campaign backed by the hugely charismatic Domingos Simoes Pereira and his coalition Party Pai Terra Ranka, had gained extraordinary momentum in the weeks leading up to the election, especially among young voters, urban populations, and civil servants disillusioned with the incumbent government.

The atmosphere on election day was broadly peaceful, and turnout was high, reinforcing expectations of a credible transfer of power. It is widely believed across the political spectrum and among independent observers that the military, under the guidance of Umaro Sissoco Embaló, acted precisely to prevent the announcement of Dias’s victory.

Previously the PAIGC party led by Domingos Simões Pereira had been campaigning in this election, but in October were excluded. What can you tell us about how the PAIGC leader Domingos Simões Pereira came to be excluded from the electoral process? And what steps Pereira took after PAIGC’s exclusion?

The exclusion of PAIGC in October was the culmination of a long and politically motivated campaign to sideline Domingos Simões Pereira and the broader anti-corruption movement he represents. The stated justification was administrative — disputes over internal party documents — but in reality, this was a strategic manoeuvre by state institutions influenced by the presidency to eliminate the most popular political force from the ballot.

Alliance

After PAIGC’s exclusion, Domingos Simões Pereira appealed the process through legal channels, but the courts (controlled by Umaro Sissoco Embaló) aligned with the presidency and rejected the appeals. DSP then allied with Fernando Dias, encouraging PAIGC/PAI Terra Ranka supporters to vote for Dias. He continued to participate actively in campaigning, including public events, civic mobilisation, and international outreach. This alliance between Dias and DSP was extremely powerful — and likely played a central role in the military intervention.

What is the composition of the PAI-Terra Ranka coalition, and how was it formed?

 PAI–Terra Ranka is a broad coalition built around:

• Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)/ African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde
• União para a Mudança (UM) / Union for Change
• Partido da Convergência Democrática (PCD) / Democratic Convergence Party
• Partido Social-Democrata, (PSD) / Social Democratic Party
• Movimento Democrático Guineense (MDG) / Guinean Democratic Movement

It was formed to unite opposition forces against entrenched corruption and authoritarian tendencies, and to revive the developmental, democratic, and social-justice ambitions historically associated with Guinea-Bissau’s liberation movement.

 The PAIGC, Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, is widely known as the movement which led the country to independence from Portugal in 1974. But (beyond Guinea Bissau or West Africa) the post-independence experience of the country is not widely known or understood at all. What kind of popular base and support does the PAIGC have today?

PAIGC remains the most deeply rooted political force in the country. Its base includes rural communities with historical ties to the independence struggle; urban middle classes; teachers, civil servants, and public-sector workers; a large share of the youth who see DSP as a moderniser and a leader with integrity and charisma; and diaspora communities, especially in Portugal, France, the UK, and Cabo Verde. Although PAIGC has faced internal tensions since the 1990s, its identity as the liberation party gives it enduring moral authority. DSP’s leadership revitalised the party, attracting technocrats, educated youth, and reform-minded voters.

Dr Domingos Simões Pereira, recently subject to illegal arrest, is leader of the PAIGC, a former Prime Minister, and also previously Head of the National Assembly. He is a figure widely respected within Guinea Bissau. Please can you summarise Domingos Simões Pereira’s background and experience for those unfamiliar with the country?

Dr. Domingos Simões Pereira (DSP) is one of the most respected statesmen of his generation in lusophone Africa. He was previously Prime Minister of Guinea-Bissau (2014-15); is the current President of the illegally dissolved National Assembly; the current President of PAIGC_PAI Terra Ranka coalition; the founder of the Institute for the Promotion of Development (IPD); and former Executive Secretary of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) (2008 to 2012).

He is academically accomplished. He graduated in civil and industrial engineering from the National Polytechnic University of Odessa (1988). In 1990 he won a scholarship to study abroad for a master’s degree and remained at California State University, Fresno, where he completed a Master of Science in Civil Engineering specializing in structures. He also holds a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from the Catholic University of Portugal and he is fluent in several languages, including English and French.

DSP is widely admired for, his integrity, forward thinking, open mind, tolerance, compassion, technocratic competence, diplomatic skill, and his vision of a modern, inclusive, diverse and democratic Guinea-Bissau. His 2024 novel KUMUS reflects on identity, development, and the ethical foundations of governance — further cementing his reputation as an intellectual and reformer. His latest book, Da Democracia em África, Um Questionamento a partir da Guiné-Bissau (2025) (Democracy in Africa, A Questioning from Guinea-Bissau) is remarkable work that combines scientific rigour, depth of thought and an unprecedented empirical analysis of the functioning of democracy in Africa, with a special focus on the Guinean reality.

DSP is widely respected domestically and internationally. His popularity, competence and reformist agenda made him the primary target of Umaro Sissoco Embaló and his regime.

The situation of imposed military control, closed borders, curfew, arbitrary arrests, and media black-out is very dangerous. What do you know of the response of international and regional actors, such as the African Union, the UN and other bodies?

Regional and international organisations have reacted quickly and, at least on paper, quite strongly.

ECOWAS (the West African regional bloc) has publicly maintained that the electoral process must be completed and the results announced. ECOWAS convened an emergency summit and has now suspended Guinea-Bissau from all its decision-making bodies in response to the 26 November coup. It condemned the takeover “in the strongest terms,” demanded the immediate restoration of constitutional order, and insisted that the National Electoral Commission must be allowed to publish the results of the 23 November elections. ECOWAS has also warned the coup leaders that they will be held individually and collectively responsible for the safety of detainees and the protection of civilians, and has threatened sanctions if constitutional rule is not restored.

At the same time, ECOWAS, led by Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio, has appointed a high-level mediation mission composed of the presidents of Togo, Cabo Verde (who later declined to attended without offering a reason) and Senegal, together with the President of the ECOWAS Commission.

This delegation has already travelled to Bissau to open talks with the junta and the National Electoral Commission, although no agreement has yet been reached. Further discussions are scheduled at the ECOWAS summit on December 14^th in Abuja, Nigeria, where the case will be presented to the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government on December 14 for a decision on how to move forward.

The African Union (AU) has issued an unusually firm response. The Chairperson of the AU Commission unequivocally condemned the coup, reiterated the AU’s “zero tolerance” for any unconstitutional change of government, and stressed that interrupting an ongoing electoral process is a grave violation of core AU norms. Shortly afterwards, the AU’s Peace and Security Council formally suspended Guinea-Bissau from all AU activities until constitutional order is restored.

The United Nations has also condemned the coup. The UN Secretary-General described the overthrow of elected authorities just days after national elections as a serious breach of constitutional order and democratic principles, and called for the “immediate and unconditional restoration” of constitutional rule, as well as the release of all detained officials, including opposition leaders and electoral authorities.

Within the region, Nigeria has played a particularly important role: not only has it echoed ECOWAS’s condemnation, but it has also granted protection to Fernando Dias da Costa, the opposition candidate widely believed to have won the election, who is now under refuge in the Nigerian Embassy in Bissau due to credible threats to his life.

What is known of the response of external powers such as France and Portugal with embassies in Guinea Bissau? What was their response to this dangerous situation?

The Portuguese Government has urged all actors in Guinea-Bissau to refrain from any form of institutional or civic violence and to ensure the restoration of normal institutional functioning so that the vote-counting process and the formal proclamation of election results can be completed, according to a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In a recent interview from Senegal, former President Umaro Sissoco Embaló publicly accused Portugal of contributing to his removal from power. He alleged that Portugal becomes “hostile” whenever a Muslim leads Guinea-Bissau, claiming that if the president bears a name such as Mamadou, Omar, or Ibrahim, relations with Lisbon deteriorate. Embaló also argued that Portuguese media coverage played a negative role in shaping perceptions of his government and contributed to political instability — echoing the reasoning he previously used to justify the expulsion of RTP and Lusa [Portuguese news agencies] from Guinea-Bissau.

These latest statements stand in stark contrast with earlier accusations by many Guinean civil-society organisations, who had criticised Portugal for allegedly supporting Embaló despite his increasingly authoritarian governance. Additionally and interestingly enough, on the evening of the alleged coup, the Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa contacted Umaro Sissoco Embaló to check on his well-being. Embaló said he was in good health and reacted gratefully. Marcelo stressed he would not go beyond this courtesy call to avoid interfering in Guinea-Bissau’s internal affairs and informed the government of the positive exchange.

The Portuguese authorities have not yet responded to these new allegations, which appear to be part of Embaló’s effort to reshape the narrative surrounding his political downfall.

French diplomacy firmly condemned the attempted coup carried out against President Umaro Sissoco Embaló. It calls for full respect for constitutional order and reaffirms its support for Guinea-Bissau’s democratic institutions. Currently (early December 2025) there is no public, authoritative “clear and comprehensive” official declaration that articulates a fully worked-out “stance” on the Guinea-Bissau crisis that differs substantially from broader Western and regional reactions. Major French media outlets and foreign-policy watchers have not (to our knowledge) published a detailed “France position paper” on this coup. Thus, while France is not currently positioning itself as a lead external intervenor, there is reason to believe it is watching developments carefully, with limited leverage compared to the past.

I read in the Portugues newspaper Público that it is envisaged that Embaló will soon return to Guinea Bissau and resume the role of President, with a view to holding new elections at some point in the future, perhaps a year from now. What do you know about such plans?

 What we can reliably verify from independent reporting is the following:

The military junta has installed General Horta Inta-A as “transitional president” and announced a one-year transition period, during which a transitional government has now been formed. That government is made up of figures closely associated with the previous regime.

Election authorities have told international media that they are currently unable to finalise or publish the results because armed men seized tally sheets and other materials from the electoral commission’s offices when the coup unfolded. However, it is widely known that copies of these tally sheets are available in the offices of all other election candidates. This fact gives further weight to the growing belief that Umaro Sissoco Embaló and his circle of associates are making a sustained attempt to prevent Fernando Dias da Costa (the president-elect) from being formally declared the winner of the election and consequently taking office

Both Embáló and Fernando Dias claimed victory before the coup, but the official count was stopped before the National Electoral Commission could declare a result.

In the Lusophone press and political commentary, there has been talk of scenarios in which external actors might tolerate a “managed” one-year transition that effectively preserves the interests of the old regime. Some interviews and opinion pieces suggest that France and other partners may be exploring options in which Embaló remains influential during this period. However, none of this has been formalised in any public ECOWAS, AU, UN, or EU decision.

For now, what exists in law and public record is the junta’s own declared one-year transition under General Horta Inta-A. Any diplomatic plan for Embaló to resume the Presidency would appear, at this stage, as rumour or informal speculation rather than an officially adopted framework.

Neighbouring countries

What is known of the response of neighbouring countries in the region, especially Senegal and Guinea?

 Senegal’s response has now become significantly clearer — and more controversial.

It has been independently confirmed that the deposed president, Umaro Sissoco Embaló, fled to Senegal after the military coup, and that he entered the country with the authorisation of President Bassirou Diomaye Faye. This development has caused major political controversy inside Senegal. Public anger grew rapidly after news of Embaló’s presence became known, leading to intense criticism that Senegal was offering protection to a leader whose actions contributed to the destabilisation of a neighbouring state.

In response to the public outcry, the Senegalese Prime Minister, Ousmane Sonko, spoke in Parliament and demanded that Embaló leave the country immediately. Sonko’s position reflects both public sentiment and a broader discomfort within Senegalese political circles about hosting a figure associated with a widely condemned interruption of a democratic electoral process. This has in turn lead to Umaro Sissoco Embaló promptly leaving Senegal to find refuge in the Republic of Congo the AFP and Associated Press news agencies are reporting. This episode demonstrates a divergence within Senegal’s leadership, with the presidency initially granting temporary shelter; the prime minister publicly rejecting Embaló’s presence; and the public expressing strong opposition.

As for Guinea (Conakry), there has been no verified public reaction or unilateral statement from its government regarding the events in Guinea-Bissau. The Guinean authorities have maintained silence, likely due to their own domestic political uncertainties and the sensitivity of commenting on military involvement in neighbouring states.

In summary: Senegal has become directly implicated due to Embaló’s flight and the ensuing political tension inside the country, while Guinea has so far remained officially silent. Cabo Verde is attentive given DSP’s stature and its close ties to Guinea-Bissau.

In the mainstream Western or international media, many analyses quickly reduce these recent developments to a longer sequence of instability and coups in Guinea Bissau and West Africa more broadly. Could you provide some context about the dynamics in Guinea Bissau which have led to the current situation?

 This crisis cannot be reduced to clichés about “cycles of coups.” The deeper dynamics include a militarised state where sections of the armed forces have historically acted independently of elected authorities; decades of politicised corruption and foreign interference; and structural fragility inherited from colonial rule. There are enduring tensions between presidential and ministerial and parliamentary powers, which are exploited by incumbents.

In recent years DSP and PAIGC have made attempts to reform security and justice sectors, which threatened entrenched interests. It is widely known that the country has become a ‘narco-state’, a condition which has been exacerbated by the regime of Umaro Sissoco Embaló. The military move is best understood as an attempt by elements linked to the toppled regime to pre-empt democratic transition and protect vested economic and political networks. Geraldo Martins in his interview, stresses that years of inaction by ECOWAS and international partners allowed the crisis to reach this breaking point. He further explains that the coup reflects systematic militarisation, personalised rule, and long‑planned efforts by Embaló to destroy PAIGC and remove DSP.

The UK-GB Community is an organisation representing the Guinea Bissauan diaspora community in the UK. This must be a very difficult time for the Guinea Bissau diaspora. What can you tell us about the experience and implications for members of the diaspora in the UK?

 The diaspora in the UK is deeply distressed. The majority of us have relatives in Guinea Bissau, which in turn brings us fear, uncertainty, and frustration at the absence of reliable news. But there is also solidarity and mobilisation. Community leaders are engaging MPs, NGOs, media, and academics. We have become one of the few channels capable of raising alarm internationally.

Do you have connections with members or organisations of the Guinea Bissau diaspora community elsewhere, for example in Portugal, France or the US?

Yes — the UK diaspora is in close contact with the large and active diaspora in Portugal, communities in France, Cabo Verde, USA and Germany. These transnational links are coordinating advocacy, monitoring rumours, sharing verified updates, and pressing governments for action.

The unfolding situation in Guinea Bissau is very grave. At a crucial moment of Presidential Elections, central to the country’s democratic process and future hopes, the country has been plunged into the darkness and fear of military rule. What are the stakes at the current moment?

The stakes are now extremely high on three interconnected fronts:

1. Democratic legitimacy and the 23 November vote
   The coup halted the electoral process precisely at the point where all indications suggested that Fernando Dias had won. The National Electoral Commission has since said it cannot complete the process because key tally documents were stolen during the break-in that accompanied the coup. If this situation is allowed to stand, it would effectively nullify a national election and normalise the idea that an army can simply freeze or erase results it dislikes.
2. The safety and survival of key political figures
   Opposition leaders such as Domingos Simões Pereira and Octávio Lopes were detained in the immediate aftermath of the coup and held incommunicado. At the same time, General Horta Inta-a has been sworn in as transitional president and has put in place a one-year transition dominated by figures from Embaló’s camp, while Embaló himself has managed to leave the country and settle abroad. This creates a deeply unequal situation: those who appear to have won the election are at risk or in hiding, while those associated with the old regime occupy the transitional institutions.
3. Regional credibility and the “coup belt”
   ECOWAS and the AU have both condemned the coup, suspended Guinea-Bissau, and called for a return to constitutional order. But if, in practice, the one-year transition is accepted without the results ever being properly announced, this will reinforce the perception that West Africa’s “coup belt” is expanding, and that regional norms against unconstitutional power grabs are weak. This would damage the credibility of ECOWAS and the AU, with implications well beyond Guinea-Bissau — including for neighbours like Senegal and Guinea, already under internal strain.

In short, what is at stake is not only the fate of specific leaders or a single election, but the principle that votes count at all in Guinea-Bissau and in the wider region. If this coup consolidates itself under the label of a “transition”, it will send a strong signal that democratic outcomes can simply be suspended or erased whenever they threaten entrenched interests.