Defending Huw Edwards’s right to free expression may make him more accountable, not less

Dr Huw Evans

Huw Edwards, the former BBC newsreader, was given a six-month prison sentence in 2024, suspended for two years, after admitting to accessing 41 illegal images of children, including seven in the most serious category. He was also placed on the sex offender’s register for seven years.

After his conviction, Edwards withdrew from public view. He has since begun to re-emerge through posts on Substack. Given the nature of his offending, that return to a public forum has prompted a strong and hostile reaction, including criticism reported by a BBC article.

Outrage

The reaction described in the BBC article has two distinct strands. The first is outrage: given the nature of Edwards’s offending, many regard his decision to speak publicly again as unacceptable.

The second strand goes further and favours prohibition. On this view, Edwards’s conduct should disqualify him from having any public platform at all.

Emma Jane Taylor’s response in the BBC article captures both strands. She said: ‘To think he can simply return to a public platform… shows a staggering lack of awareness…. He is on the sex offender’s register – that should not entitle him to a blog.’

These two strands are connected, but they are conceptually different. A person might regard Edwards’s decision to return to public commentary as a serious lapse of judgment while still defending, in principle, his right to express a view.

Emma Jane Taylor is clearly not in that camp. In her view, Edwards should not have the right to express his views publicly. That position is not unreasonable, but in this situation, I disagree with her. The following discussion explains why.

The limits of free expression

Freedom of expression is not an absolute right. It may be restricted where necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others. The laws on defamation, privacy and incitement to violence are obvious examples.

The starting point, however, is that freedom of expression serves a public interest. That presumption can be displaced where a stronger countervailing public interest is shown. For example, a court may grant an injunction preventing someone from speaking publicly about an intimate relationship to protect another person’s privacy.

Huw Edwards – case against free expression

Emma Jane Taylor’s position appears to be that Edwards’s inclusion on the sex offenders’s register should deprive him of the right to express his views publicly. The implied logic is as follows: he has been convicted of a serious offence; criminal sentencing can legitimately restrict a person’s liberty; and the sex offender’s register is itself a form of continuing restriction.

On that view, denying Edwards access to a public platform would be a further legitimate consequence of his offending and part of the wider punishment. There would, therefore, be a public interest in restricting his freedom of expression while he remains on the register.

At face value, this is a reasoned and reasonable argument. But there is also a reasoned and reasonable alternative viewpoint.

Huw Edwards – case for free expression

Edwards is a convicted sex offender, but he was not given an immediate custodial sentence. His case was also dealt with in the magistrates court rather than the Crown Court, which generally hears more serious cases.
Any proposal to restrict the freedom of expression of convicted people would need to be considered across the criminal justice system, beginning with the most serious cases. Applied here, such a restriction seems disproportionate.

As to the subject matter of Edwards’s post, he did not say anything inherently objectionable. That is a legitimate factor to consider when assessing whether he should be able to say it publicly.

The objection was directed at Edwards personally, rather than at the substance of what he said. In that sense, this was a case of attacking the messenger, not the message.

The third—and, in my view, decisive—factor is rooted in freedom of expression itself: not only Edwards’ freedom to speak, but the freedom of others to respond to what he says and, perhaps more tellingly, to what he does not say.

Without Edwards having that right, and then exercising it, Emma Jane Taylor could not have responded as she did.

Article 10 of the ECHR protects freedom of expression. That includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas. In the Edwards case, the right to receive and exchange information and ideas is especially important.

The public can observe the exchange between Edwards and his critics and form its own judgment. If Edwards had been prevented from initiating that exchange, the public’s judgment would have been less informed.

Edwards could have acted differently. He could have remained out of public view for longer, or framed his return more carefully—for example, by leading with a statement of remorse rather than responding only after criticism. He chose not to do so, and that choice is itself part of free expression.

Postscript

On his Substack page, Edwards describes himself as a ‘journalist, author, broadcaster’. The formulation is striking. He was, of course, all three.

His recent posts on Substack may arguably support the description ‘journalist’, and perhaps ‘author’ too.

Whether those labels remain appropriate is for others to judge.

The description ‘broadcaster’ is harder to sustain. Edwards is no longer a broadcaster in any meaningful sense, and it is unlikely that this will change.

This self-description is likely to reinforce criticism that Edwards lacks insight into the seriousness of his conduct and has an unrealistic view of his status.

A more candid description might have been: ‘convicted sex offender, former journalist, former author, former broadcaster’.

That judgment arises directly from the exercise of freedom of expression: Edwards is free to speak, and others are free to assess what his words (or the lack of them) reveal.