Reform: Enjoy it while you can

Brenig Davies

For most of its short political life, and that of the parties that came before it, from the UKIP to the Brexit Party, Reform UK has functioned as a warning to the British establishment. Now, increasingly, it risks becoming part of that same system.

The local elections of 2025 and 2026 marked an important shift. Reform moved beyond protest politics and began to look like a serious party. Hundreds of council seats were secured, and authorities fell under Reform control.

A movement once dismissed as little more than a limited political vehicle, and a private company built around narrow objectives, began presenting itself as a serious force capable of reshaping the British right.

Yet success in opposition can quickly become a burden in government because winning popular protest votes is one thing, but governing is another.

The real question facing Reform may not be whether it can continue performing strongly in local elections, but whether the transition from insurgency to administration ultimately weakens its chances of winning a general election.

Political history suggests that movements built on disruption and seductive answers to complex social problems often struggle once they inherit responsibility.

Britain is not alone in this regard. Across Europe, insurgent parties have risen rapidly by presenting themselves as alternatives to stagnant systems, only to discover that governing is far more difficult than campaigning.

In countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain, anti-establishment movements surged in the polls before losing momentum once confronted by the realities of power, compromise, and internal division. The politics differed, but the pressures were broadly analogous.

Supporters see Reform’s rise as the beginning of a wider realignment. Critics see something more worrying, not merely a rejection of Westminster, but a growing hostility toward many of the assumptions and institutions that have shaped British public life for decades.

Movements that thrive on opposition often struggle when asked to run the very systems they spent years attacking.

Clarity

Campaigning rewards clarity, anger, and emotional force, while government is slower, untidier, and less forgiving. The energy that unsettles political systems in opposition can dissipate quickly once confronted with the practical demands of administration.

Its support is driven less by a coherent governing philosophy than by frustration with the direction of British politics: immigration, net-zero policies, distrust of Westminster and deep disillusionment with both Labour and the Conservatives.

For many voters, Reform functions less as an ideological movement than as a vehicle for political discontent.

So, there are contradictions within that coalition. Reform performs strongly in areas marked by economic insecurity, ill health, and significant reliance on public services. Many of its voters are not necessarily hostile to the welfare state itself so much as to how they believe it runs and who receives help from it.

This sits awkwardly beside Reform’s intention to reduce the size of the state.

By 2026, Reform controlled around fourteen councils across England. Numerically, that is still a small share of local government. Politically, however, it matters because Reform is no longer simply protesting against institutions. It is now expected to run them.

Insurgent parties

Opposition politics allows insurgent parties to flourish through rhetoric. Once councils are under Reform control, voters begin judging performance rather than slogans. Bin collections and potholes matter. Staffing disputes, planning rows, council tax decisions, and social care provision become immediate tests of competence.

Voters who enjoy rebellion in opposition often become remarkably traditional once public services begin to fail.

Some of those pressures are already visible. At Kent County Council, internal disagreements over appointments and spending priorities quickly attracted media attention after Reform became the authority’s largest party.

Elsewhere, controversies involving Reform figures at Warwickshire County Council highlighted how quickly outsider movements can become exposed to the same scrutiny and reputational pressures as the parties they once condemned. This may become Reform’s central difficulty.

Its electoral coalition holds competing instincts: former Conservatives alienated by immigration policy, disillusioned Labour voters in post-industrial communities, anti-net-zero campaigners, anti-establishment voters and those suspicious of state intervention.

Such coalitions can be politically fragile and almost impossible to manage.

Governing requires choices, and choices disappoint people. At the same time, modern populist movements do not always respond to criticism as traditional parties once did. Reform leaders are currently often absent from sustained mainstream media scrutiny, a trend that may not persist if the party moves closer to national power.

Voters who do not separate local and national politics may ultimately decide Reform’s future. If dissatisfaction with council services grows under Reform-controlled authorities, some voters may begin to question whether the party is ready for government at the national level.

Protest votes

The challenge is no longer whether Reform can attract protest votes. The unanswerable question is whether it can survive the transition from insurgent movement to governing force without losing the energy that powered its rise.

Sustaining power is harder than campaigning.

Reform’s growing presence in local government may yet become an early test of whether anti-establishment politics can successfully evolve into durable administration, or whether protest movements lose their appeal once they begin to resemble government. In Reform’s case, the General Election.