The US and Israel pose the biggest threat to British democracy

Martin Shipton

I have already written about a frightening experience that my wife and I were subjected to this week when eight members of the counter-terrorism division of the Metropolitan Police smashed their way into our home as part of an investigation into alleged espionage on behalf of China.

I was not arrested, but the police officers had a search warrant that authorised them to seize our laptops, mobile phones and other electronic devices, as well as my passport.

My earlier article explained that in 2023 I had travelled to Hong Kong with my friend David Taylor to meet a representative of a think tank based in Shanghai that advised President Xi on international relations.

David Taylor and two other friends were arrested on the same day as my house was searched.

There is no need for me to go further into the incident itself, but it has raised important questions about the way the law relating to espionage activities has changed and how new arrangements are working out.

Traditionally, and in popular culture, spying consists of stealing military secrets. It then extended to commercial secrets. Now, according to a piece of legislation dating from 2023, it can theoretically involve passing any information to a foreign power.

The National Security Act 2023 had, I readily confess, not engaged my radar until this week, when it was invoked to justify the search warrant relating to my house. (Perhaps significantly, it wasn’t in force when I went to Hong Kong).

Section 3 of the Act states: “A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct of any kind, and intends that conduct to materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities.

“A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct that is likely to materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities, and knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is likely to materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities.”

Interestingly, the Section does not specify that harm to UK interests must occur for an offence to be committed.

In parallel, the Act has also set up a Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) with which organisations must register if they:

* have an arrangement with any foreign power to influence UK politics;

* have an arrangement with a specified foreign power, or an entity they control, to do activities in the UK;

* are a specified foreign power-controlled entity doing activities in the UK;

* work for a foreign power and misrepresent their identity or capacity when doing activities in the UK.

The Act goes on to specify that organisations engaging in lobbying activities intended to influence politicians at Westminster or in the devolved legislatures on behalf of foreign powers have to register with FIRS.

I wanted to see how many organisations had registered since the scheme opened.

Knowing that lobbying is a major industry in the political world, I naively expected that hundreds of entries would appear on the list, which incidentally wasn’t easy to find: I was only able to access it after seeking advice from the Home Office press office.

Much to my surprise, the number of organisations that have registered with FIRS is a mere 11. And it has to be said that the groups concerned represent countries that no one would characterise as typical haunts for high-powered lobbyists.

The 11 consist of groups hoping to get positive outcomes for these countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina (2), Congo (1), Democratic Republic of Congo (1), Guinea (1), Libya (1), Qatar (2), Somaliland (1), St Lucia (1) and Taiwan (1).

Could that really be the extent of the organisations promoting the interests of foreign countries in the UK? From my own knowledge, that made absolutely no sense.

Exemption

I then noticed an important exemption in the legislation: “Foreign powers (as well as their employees and office holders) are not required to register their own activities, providing that they are open and honest about who they represent.”

It goes on to state: “This exemption does not apply where a person acting for the foreign power makes a misrepresentation about who they are, or the capacity in which they act. A misrepresentation includes where the individual purports to be someone else, represent someone else or be in a role which is different to the one in which they are in. It may be made by making a statement or by any other kind of conduct (including an omission), and may be express or implied. It could also include presenting information in a way which amounts to a misrepresentation, even if some or all of the information is true. This could be the case if, for example, if someone were open that they worked for a foreign power, but did not mention that they were an intelligence officer.”

However, “activities which are carried out directly by UK-based diplomatic missions, consular posts and permanent missions of foreign states to a UK-based international organisation, as well as the official activities of their diplomats and locally engaged staff members, are covered by this exemption.”

An example is given: “An official of an agency of the Government of Country W communicates with UK senior officials, seeking to influence a visa decision for a high-profile individual of Country W to visit the UK. Whilst this constitutes political influence activity, no registration is required as the activity is carried out by the foreign power itself.”

However, the exemption would not apply in circumstances where a covert intelligence officer working for the Government of Country X attends a conference in the UK and presents himself as a businessman for a private company. He speaks to Members of the House of Lords at the conference and seeks to influence their voting decision on a piece of legislation currently being considered by Parliament. While the officer is employed by a foreign power, he is not open and honest about the capacity in which he is acting, so the exemption does not apply.

Absurd

It seems to me that the way this Act is framed is absurd. Our democracy is not at risk from strategically insignificant small countries that have been encouraged to register with FIRS, but from foreign powers like the United States and Israel, that don’t need to act covertly because they have had a huge overt influence over successive UK governments, encouraging them to go to war or provide weapons and logistical support for a genocide.

In terms of interfering with British democracy, you can’t get more blatant than the way Elon Musk has skewed his social media platform into pushing the expression of far-right viewpoints.

If the current UK Government seriously wanted to tackle foreign interference in our politics, it would take drastic action to curtail the activities of the United States and Israel. But it doesn’t, so it won’t.