Why federalism could be Wales’ strongest road to independence

Jack Meredith

The Welsh independence movement has already done something important; it has changed the terms of debate.

Questions that were once treated as fringe are now discussed openly: who governs Wales, where power sits, what accountability means, and whether the current constitutional settlement is fit for purpose. That is a genuine democratic contribution, and it deserves respect.

So this is not an argument against Welsh independence. It is an argument about route, sequencing, and stability.

My concern is that too much constitutional debate, in Wales and beyond, treats independence as a single political event. A vote is won, sovereignty is declared, and the matter is settled. But democratic stability does not work like that. States are not built by declaration alone. They are built through institutions, legal clarity, administrative capacity, fiscal credibility, and public trust.

In other words, independence is not only about sovereignty; it is also about statecraft.

That is why federalism, followed later by a confederal relationship, offers Wales a more stable path to an independent future than the model often implied in parts of the wider independence conversation.

The current devolution settlement is plainly inadequate as a long-term constitutional home. It leaves Wales with responsibility in some areas, dependence in others, and far too often blame without the corresponding power to act. It is uneven, politically vulnerable, and structurally unstable because it still rests on Westminster sovereignty rather than entrenched constitutional guarantees.

That fragility matters. It means Welsh self-government can expand, stall, or be reinterpreted according to pressures outside Wales. It also encourages a politics of permanent grievance, because the lines of responsibility are too often blurred.

Federalism would not solve every constitutional problem, nor would it satisfy every ambition of the independence movement. But it would force a level of seriousness that the present system avoids. A federal settlement requires a clearer division of powers, stricter intergovernmental rules, firmer constitutional protections, and a more honest settlement on finance and responsibility.

For Wales, that would be a major step forward.

It would mean moving from a system shaped by convention and improvisation to one shaped by clearer rules. It would give Welsh institutions a stronger constitutional footing. It would sharpen accountability by making it harder for governments at different levels to hide behind one another. It would also require a more mature conversation about taxation, borrowing, redistribution, and economic trade-offs; the real foundations of durable self-government.

That matters even, and perhaps especially, if one’s long-term aim is independence.

Resilient

If Wales is ever to become independent in a way that is resilient rather than merely symbolic, then preparation matters. Institutional memory matters. Administrative capacity matters. Constitutional habits matter. A country that has had to govern itself within a robust federal framework is better placed to manage a future transition to sovereignty than one attempting to build everything under maximum political pressure.

This is where I part company with more romantic forms of independence politics. I understand the appeal of the clean break argument. In a political culture where Wales is frequently treated as peripheral, moral clarity can be energising. But constitutional transitions are not only moral arguments; they are also practical negotiations about currency, debt, pensions, regulation, cross-border services, infrastructure, trade, and the everyday machinery of public life.

For a country like Wales, with deep social and economic interdependence across the England-Wales border, stability is not a bureaucratic obsession. It is a democratic obligation.

That is why I favour a federal-first, confederal-later approach.

Constitutional protection

Federal first, because Wales needs stronger constitutional protection and deeper governing capacity than devolution currently provides. Federal first, because the present settlement is too weak, but immediate rupture could impose avoidable transitional risks. Federal first, because even those committed to independence should want Wales to inherit stronger institutions, clearer fiscal practice, and more constitutional muscle before making the final leap.

Then become confederal later, because independence in the modern world is never absolute.

No state, however proud its sovereignty, operates in total isolation. Countries pool authority, coordinate standards, and share institutions where it serves their interests. The real question is not whether Wales would be interdependent after independence; it would be. The real question is whether that interdependence would be chosen, negotiated, and democratically accountable.

A confederal relationship offers a way to think about that seriously. It allows sovereign states to cooperate by treaty in areas of shared interest while preserving democratic control at home. For Wales, that could mean a framework for managing cross-border mobility, infrastructure, energy coordination, trade continuity, and practical cooperation without reverting to constitutional subordination.

That is not a dilution of independence. It is Welsh independence designed for reality.

Unrealistic

Some will object that federalism is politically unrealistic because there is too little appetite for it across the UK, especially in England. That objection may be correct in the short term. But that does not make federal thinking irrelevant. It makes it more useful.

Federalism can function as a constitutional test. It asks whether the UK is capable of becoming a stable union of equals, with rules that protect all its nations and institutions that distribute power more honestly. If the answer is no, then the case for Welsh sovereignty is clarified and strengthened, not because Wales rejected partnership, but because meaningful partnership was refused.

That is a stronger argument than simply denouncing Westminster in general terms. Governments come and go; constitutional incentives endure.

Wales needs a constitutional strategy built for endurance, not just mobilisation. The question is not simply whether Wales should be independent one day. The question is what route gives Wales the best chance of becoming independent on strong foundations, governable, resilient, and democratically secure.

The best answer is federalism as a transitional architecture, and confederation as the long-term framework for neighbourly cooperation between sovereign states.

If Wales is to pursue independence, it should do so with ambition, certainly, but also with institutional seriousness. We do not need less constitutional imagination. We need more of it, and we need the kind that survives contact with reality.