Does Welsh rugby really need to axe a region?

Evan Wall

Having previously cooled discussion on the subject of cutting a Welsh region by kicking the can down the road, the WRU have now reached that part of the road to where they kicked the can.

They say time is the great healer, but it has done very little to help the WRU’s troubles. As it has been since their initial announcement, there remains widespread opposition to their proposal to cut a region.

The WRU’s latest announcement changes very little. It was already widely expected that either the Ospreys or Scarlets would be placed in the firing line.

What is more significant, perhaps, is the WRU’s continued refusal to engage seriously with alternative proposals.

Despite sustained opposition from supporters, politicians, former players and commentators, the WRU has continually buried its head in the sand.

In my view, there are two fundamental issues. The first is that the WRU has reached for cuts to rugby before tackling its own organisational costs. The second is that the regional model itself has never worked in Wales as effectively as other places such as Ireland.

Ireland has long-standing rivalries between its provinces and subsequently Irish rugby has its four branches based on the 800-hundred-year-old geographical provinces. Thus, the regional system mirrors existing identities and is easier for supporters to buy into.

In Wales, by contrast, rugby culture has traditionally been rooted in local – not regional – rivalries, making supporter buy-in considerably more difficult.

As a testament to the regional system’s inefficiency in Wales, alongside the WRU’s unwillingness to accept that the system itself is the problem, professional rugby is being taken away from the Swansea or West Wales area.

No matter any past success, rather than strengthening professional rugby, the regional system in Wales is a failure because it has reached the point where one of the country’s strongest rugby-producing areas is set to lose its professional team.

The proposed murder of the Ospreys or Scarlets is, by the WRU’s own admission, a financial decision.

Following the Italy match, Dave Reddin, WRU director of rugby and elite performance, described it as a matter of “simple economics.” Reddin’s comment reveals the extent to which those making decisions about the future of Welsh rugby are focused more on balancing spreadsheets in the short term than on enacting the structural change needed for the game to flourish again.

Reddin’s remarks also revealed something broader about the WRU’s current approach. Although his title is Director of Rugby and Elite Performance, his role is fundamentally one of ‘strategic leadership’ and ‘organisational transformation’ rather than day-to-day dealing with the rugby itself.

Reddin embodies how the emphasis within the WRU has increasingly shifted towards strategy, governance and organisational restructuring. My question is whether this growing strategic apparatus has itself become part of the financial problem?

A brief comparison with the Irish Rugby Football Union (IRFU) could suggest so.

Turnover

A striking difference between the two systems is that the WRU’s turnover is just over £100m, yet only around 60% of its revenue goes towards rugby costs. Meanwhile, the IRFU’s turnover is between £70–80m, with 65–75% of its revenue going towards rugby.

Of course, no comparison between Wales and Ireland is perfect. Ireland’s income and expenditure figure does not include major items like the Aviva Stadium, whereas the Welsh Rugby Union owns the Principality Stadium and a hotel in the City Centre.

Nonetheless, the comparison reveals major differences in spending. Significantly, Ireland invests just under £38m in its professional teams, whereas in Wales only around £25m goes towards the professional game. Again, the regional clubs in Wales have different responsibilities. Unlike, in Wales where much of the operation is centralised, in Ireland Each branch has responsibility for organising and managing the game from the school and amateur-level to the pro game. Irish regions have much wider responsibility than Welsh regions.

Although the responsibilities of the two systems differ, the overall picture remains difficult to ignore: the WRU oversees greater revenues, yet substantially less reaches the professional game. If Ireland can sustain four professional teams, why has the WRU reached the point where reducing the professional game is viewed as the only viable option?

The cost of bureaucracy

If the WRU’s financial problems are genuine, then the first place to examine is the cost of running the WRU itself.

Part of the answer lies in how each union spends its money. The IRFU spent approximately £9.9 million on administration, marketing and support in 2022 — roughly 10% of its expenditure. By contrast, the WRU directs around 25% of its spending towards governance, administration and bureaucracy.

According to its financial report, across business and administration, direct costs and hospitality, the WRU spent approximately £24.6 million. In simple terms, one pound in every four earned by the WRU is spent on running the organisation itself, rather than on rugby.

Staffing reflects this imbalance. The IRFU operates with around 250 central staff, some embedded within the provinces. The WRU employs more than 300 centrally, pointing to an organisation heavier at its core, with more layers of administration.

The needs of operating the Principality Stadium explain some of this difference. However, the WRU also places a significant emphasis on strategy, governance and organisational management, all of which come at considerable cost.

The available information suggests a number of high-paying roles and departments within the WRU that are strategic and largely removed from the day-to-day running of rugby in Wales. While exact figures are not publicly available, these roles together cost in the millions.

One of the biggest changes to the WRU under Abi Tierney has been the creation of a much more corporate-style executive structure. While the executive team itself was reduced from nine to five members, several senior leadership roles have been strengthened or created beneath it.

The WRU now includes a wide range of senior, strategy-focused roles, including a Chief Growth Officer, an Equality, Diversity and Inclusion department, Chief People Officer, Director of Sales, Director of Corporate Affairs, Director of Women’s Rugby, Director of Rugby and Elite Performance and new Technical Directors.

These are roles primarily concerned with governance, strategy, commercial development and organisational management rather than the direct delivery of rugby on the field. For example, Dave Reddin’s title is Director of Rugby and Elite Performance is much broader than coaching or managing rugby itself. It is fundamentally a strategic leadership and systems role rather than a hands-on rugby role.

These individuals at the top of the WRU are paid extremely high salaries. WRU CEO Abi Tierney is estimated to receive approximately £350,000 a year -more than double what she earned in her previous role at HM Passport Office – while her total remuneration package is likely to cost the organisation close to half a million pounds annually.

Although no official figures have been published, estimates place Dave Reddin’s salary as Director of Rugby and Elite Performance at between £220,000 and £300,000. The position of Technical Director, which reports directly to Reddin, was recently advertised at a salary of £160,000 per year.

Chief Operating Officer Gavin Marshall, whose role oversees the operational side of the WRU and leaves Abi Tierney to strategic decision-making, is likely earning a salary of between £180,000-£250,000 a year.

The now departed first-ever independent chair of the WRU, Richard Collier-Keywood, earned a likely estimated £60,000-70,000 for working one-day-a-week based on comparisons to similar governance roles.

In salaries alone, this layer of senior strategic positions is estimated to cost around £1.5 million annually. Once employer National Insurance, pensions, expenses and employee benefits are included, the true annual cost is likely to approach £2 million.

It’s worth emphasising that this isn’t a problem with the current regime alone and the costs do not end there. One point worth noting is that the WRU has previously disclosed that former CEO Steve Phillips received a £359,000 salary and, on resigning he received a £480,000 compensation for loss of office. In 2023, £1.9 million was given to departing staff by the WRU. The costs of executives, even after they depart, is crippling for Welsh rugby.

These strategic departments and senior leadership structures cost the WRU millions annually and they should be the first place to look in any cost-cutting process. Professional rugby in Swansea and West Wales should be the very last option.

Consultants and cost leakage

It is entirely reasonable that a modern governing body employs experienced senior executives. What is more difficult to justify is the continued reliance on expensive external consultants despite the growth of internal strategic capacity. The WRU has continued to spend heavily on outsourced work.

There is little transparency around how much has been paid to consultancies, meaning the full extent of this spending is unclear. However, the available evidence suggests it is significant. The WRU accounts show £1.9 million spent on restructuring costs in a single year (2022–23).

At least part of the 2025 “future of elite rugby” consultation was outsourced to external firms. Conservative estimates suggest this process may have cost between £750,000 and £1.5 million.

Even basing judgement off estimates, the sums of money being given to bureaucrats within the organisation and consultancies are the very sums that could help sustain professional rugby in Swansea or West Wales.

The precise sums are less important than the broader point. At a time when the WRU argues it cannot afford four professional teams, significant sums of money are spent on consultancy and organisational restructuring.

Spending priorities

Before removing professional rugby from Swansea or Llanelli, the WRU should first examine its own spending priorities.

There are clear alternatives. For example, reducing administrative overhead, streamlining roles, and limiting reliance on consultants would free up significant resources without weakening the professional game.

First and foremost, the WRU is an organisation that has squandered far too much of its funds (this also includes public funds) on outsourcing work to consultancies. Before it looks to cut a region, it needs to look at it its own spending habits.

Second, the WRU carries too much bureaucratic weight as an organisation more generally. Rather than cutting away that deadwood, it is instead trying to remove one of the ship’s engine rooms — the Ospreys or Scarlets — to temporarily lighten the load.

Whatever the answer may be, supporters from across Welsh rugby must unite and oppose the WRU’s bid to cut professional rugby in Swansea or Llanelli. It cannot be allowed to happen.

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